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What Semipalatinsk Tells Us About Parchin

Posted on January 21, 2013 by Cheryl

The standoff continues between Iran and the IAEA about an inspection of the Parchin facility that is suspected of holding a containment tank for explosives tests related to nuclear weapons development.

Robert Kelley has renewed his objection that such a containment tank makes no sense. His latest argument is a bit more nuanced, that such a chamber is not necessary for nuclear weapons development, particularly at an early stage. And

There are a range of experiments involving explosives and uranium that a country presumably would conduct as part of a nuclear weapon development programme. Most of these are better done in the open or in a tunnel. They include basic research on neutron initiators using very small amounts of explosive and grams of uranium and on the very precise timing of a neutron initiator using a full-scale conventional explosion system and many kilograms of uranium. The alleged chamber at Parchin is too large for the initiator tests and too small for a full-scale explosion. If it exists at all, it is a white elephant.

As Kelley mentions, testing neutron initiators and their timing is one way such a container might be used in a nuclear weapons program. It could also be used for hydrodynamic and hydronuclear tests.

Containment tanks called kolbas were used for hydrodynamic or hydronuclear tests at Semipalatinsk. The Soviets even used them inside tunnels, counter to Kelley’s assertion that experiments would be better done without them. Making fissionable material in them unavailable to scavengers was the object of Operation Matchbox, described by Sig Hecker at his talk that I reported. He had photos of kolbas with dimensions in the same range as those alleged for the Parchin vessel. Susan checked out the dimensions more closely back in May.

Kelley also mentions Vyacheslav Danilenko, so I’ll say again that working at a nuclear weapons lab, as Danilenko did, is likely to expose you to weapons information, even if that’s not what you’re working on. This was the case in the 1960s, when Danilenko was at Snezhinsk, much more so than it is now.

It’s possible that Danilenko passed no nuclear weapons information to the Iranians. It’s also possible that the Iranians are not developing nuclear weapons and therefore have no need of a test container, or that they did experiments related to nuclear weapons development without such a container. But the IAEA seems to have some evidence that points toward a container and such experiments, probably more than we have seen publicly.

We don’t know what is the truth. A visit to Parchin and sampling by the IAEA would go a long way toward establishing it.

This entry was posted in Iran, Nonproliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Union and tagged , , , . Bookmark the permalink.
  • sir_mixxalot

    No really a visit would not establish the truth — as Olli points out, even if they found zilch (like the last two times) now they can say it was sanitized. Kelley is right — this is stupid side distraction. See Olli’s view –

    http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0420/Iran-s-Parchin-complex-Why-are-nuclear-inspectors-so-focused-on-it

    “But veteran inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) say the singular focus on visiting Parchin is a departure for the Agency that could jeopardize its credibility, considering the host of issues that remain between the IAEA and Iran. Also unusual is how open and specific the IAEA has been about what exactly it wants to see, which could yield doubts about the credibility of any eventual inspection.

    “I’m puzzled that the IAEA wants to in this case specify the building in advance, because you end up with this awkward situation,” says Olli Heinonen, the IAEA’s head of safeguards until mid-2010.

    “First of all, if it gets delayed it can be sanitized. And it’s not very good for Iran. Let’s assume [inspectors] finally get there and they find nothing. People will say, ‘Oh, it’s because Iran has sanitized it,’” says Mr. Heinonen, who is now at Harvard University in Cambridge, Mass. ”But in reality it may have not been sanitized. Iran is also a loser in that case. I don’t know why [the IAEA] approach it this way, which was not a standard practice; but they may have a reason.”"

    =========

    And there is no legal obligation for Iran to open Parchin up (again!)

  • sir_mixxalot

    Oh, from that same article below — do you know a guy called Hans Blix? Here is his view —

    Hans Blix, former chief of the IAEA and later of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq, has also expressed surprise at the focus on Parchin, as a military base that inspectors had been to before.”Any country, I think, would be rather reluctant to let international inspectors to go anywhere in a military site,” Mr. Blix told Al Jazeera English about Parchin in late March. “In a way, the Iranians have been more open than most other countries would be.”

  • Robert Kelley

    Hi Cheryl  Please read what I say before you set out to mischaracterize it.  I have always said Danilenko is from C-70.  He published on dianostics with BV Litvinov and I have asserted clearly he started his career in the weapons porgram.  Please don’t twist my words.  Kolbas are fine and have been known for a long time.  Sandia even contracted with the Russians for technology to contain IEDs.  They come in many shapes and sizes.  Some, as Susan pointed out, are very complex with multiple layers of shock absorbing materials and sophisticated design.  Do you believe the kolba at Parchin is highly sophisticated or just a big steel tank that has to be reinforced with a massive concrete block on the outside?  Your opinion please.  The Soviets were trying to contain Special Nuclear Material from what you assert.  That is a very different purpose from trying to contain a few grams of very cheap natural uranium.  How much time elapsed between the time Danilenko designed the chamber and it was put in place?  Why is IAEA twisting the facts about the imagery?  That is the thesis of my articles.  If they are using mischaracterization and exageration to get their way, and the Iranians know it, then mistrust is high on both sides.  Where are those pesky pink tarps, anyway?

    • ISIS

      Dear Mr. Kelley, I would like to point out that in your discussion of the suspected chamber at Parchin you described it as 300tonne plus while in reality such a mass correlates with 900 cubic meter chambers intended for 250kg to 1tonne explosive charges, based on information in Danilenko’s writings. The Parchin chamber would be closer to 300 cubic meters. As for the chamber construction and Danilenko timeline, please keep in mind that Danilenko was contacted by the Iranians in the mid 90s and was in Iran or in contact with Iranians until 2002 leaving plenty of time for design and construction. Moreover the cement block around the chamber was part of standard design for a chamber that size rather than a measure to make up for rush construction timelines. Finally on the issue of insulation, imagery from September 19, 2012 (a month after the image you presented in your report) published on the ISIS website shows what you describe as insulation to have been rolled back exposing the original roofs. There would be little sense to put insulation on top of the roof and then take it off a month later, especially in the late summer/early fall. Moreover, the imagery strongly suggests that the material was a soft, tarp like material while there is no evidence to suggest that it is solid insulation material aside from the unrelated image you offered.  
      I do agree with the fact that Parchin should be seen as part of the wider picture of unanswered questions regarding potential weaponization efforts and that a visit to the site as soon as possible could go a long way in improving the current atmosphere. 

      • sir_mixxalot

        Oh, Is this David NotAllThatBright? Keeping quiet these days, huh?

        Kindly read the two posts below why inspections will not resolve this issue.
        Let’s pretend ISIS has some magic satellites that they can tell solid vs. fabric from space, why would Iran choose to use bright pink? 

        Is that considered a stealth color by the geniuses at ISIS? 

        I know you don’t have any real PhD-level scientists at your Institution, but some competent people have commented on this issue at:

        http://armscontrollaw.com/2013/01/22/yousaf-butt-pretty-in-pink-the-parchin-preoccupation-paradox

        morons.

      • sir_mixxalot

        Is there a reason that the alleged tarps would be bright pink? To attract attention from US spy sats?

      • sir_mixxalot

        See the two posts at the end why inspections will not help — even Olli says so!

    • Cheryl Rofer

      Hi Bob  -

      I’m sorry – I haven’t been keeping up wiht comments on the site. I may have conflated your comments on Danilenko’s with those from others. So I apologize if I mischaracterized anything you said. I don’t know whether there is a containment vessel at Parchin, much less what it looks like. It seems to me that none of us do, beyond that one very sketchy drawing that was leaked. Susan’s links suggest some of the possibilites.

      You focus on one possible use of that alleged containment vessel, but there are others, as the kolbas illustrate. You have not addressed the possibility of hydrodynamic or hydronuclear tests. How do you know that only one particular type of initiator experiment was the focus?

      Although you mention timelines, you have not published any with citations. You have made assertions as to what came before which, not the same thing. I haven’t seen a strong argument that the IAEA is “twisting the facts about the imagery.” 

      In short, there’s a lot we don’t know about Parchin, and it’s important to be clear about what we know and how we know it.

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