Iran keeps its uranium facilities but with capabilities to enrich reduced to levels fit only for civilian use. Tehran also agrees to the tightest international verification procedures. The West lifts sanctions gradually as Iran complies with both reconfiguring its nuclear plants and accepts the necessary verification.

Iran would accept top-notch IAEA safeguards in return for being allowed to continue enriching uranium. In addition, Iran would volunteer some confidence-building measures to show that it has no intention of making nuclear weapons.

What do they want, what do we want and what do we both want?

Iran wants recognition of its revolution; an accepted role in its region; a nuclear program; the departure of the United States from the Middle East; and the lifting of sanctions. The United States wants Iran not to have nuclear weapons; security for Israel; a democratic evolution of Arab countries; the end of terrorism; and world access to the region’s oil and gas. Both Iran and the United States want stability in the region — particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan; the end of terrorism from Al Qaeda and the Taliban; the reincorporation of Iran into the international community; and no war.

There is no guarantee that diplomacy will succeed. But that is also true of war. And only diplomacy can offer Iran’s current rulers a stake in building a secure future without a nuclear bomb. Only diplomacy can achieve America’s major objectives while avoiding the mistakes committed in Iraq or Vietnam.

Since we’re unlikely to engage in sustained military action, we should take the option off the table. Offer Iran a straight-forward quid pro quo — we commit to not use force to change their regime in return for them normalizing their international status through a new IAEA-based inspection regime of their nuclear facilities. Assuming they don’t accept — as they won’t — continue to use sabotage and assassinations to slow their progress toward nukes. And most importantly dramatically step up efforts to promote change in Iran through aggressive efforts to defeat Iranian government censorship of radio, TV, and internet. Assuming that does not work either, we need to work on promoting regional resilience so that the rest of the region doesn’t freak out about developments in Iran. Mitigation of the Iranian problem is key rather than solving it for now.

It contains the germ of what could become an agreement by Iran to limit enrichment to 5% U-235; an agreement by Iran to limit enrichment activity in Iran to just one [in some versions of what's on the table two] locations in Iran; and--finally and crucially--an agreement by Iran to afford the IAEA access to sites, personnel, and data to permit it to conclude whether the Iranian nuclear program is in its judgment dedicated to peaceful use only. That means implementation of the Additional Protocol.

Before negotiations with Iran begin, it is essential that an agreement is reached among the P5+1 (hopefully with the support of other major stakeholders such as Turkey) on what they will offer to Iran and what would be the consequences if Iran further escalates the nuclear crisis.

The first major goal in solving Iran’s nuclear impasse is for the [IAEA] to be able to draw a “broad conclusion” that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran, and that Iran’s declarations to the IAEA are correct and complete. To reach such a conclusion within a reasonable period of time...Iran would have to conclude with the IAEA and fully implement a Temporary Complementary Protocol (TCP).

the IAEA Board of Governors should commit to accord Iran a grace period during which Iran would not be penalized should it voluntarily disclose the existence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, and/or acknowledge any past violations of the NPT or of its safeguards agreement.

Until the IAEA has drawn a “broad conclusion,” Iran should commit to send abroad its domestic stockpile of LEU every six months for incorporation into fabricated fuel assemblies for the Bushehr reactor and possibly other light water reactors, while continuing to enrich uranium below 5% U-235. It would also be important that Iran concludes an Infcirc/66-type safeguards agreement with the IAEA for all nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

As long as Iran does not suspend its enrichment-related activities or the IAEA does not reach a “broad conclusion,” it is very unlikely that the UNSC would lift present sanctions. However, as soon (and as long) as Iran agrees to implement the TCP and the other requirements mentioned above, the P5+1 could commit to not implement additional sanctions and the US and the EU could commit to progressively suspend sanctions going beyond those decided by the UNSC...

Once the IAEA has reached a “broad conclusion,” Iran would no longer be obliged to export its domestic production of LEU, and UNSC sanctions would progressively be lifted.

To dissuade Iran from escalating the tension, the UNSC should adopt a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter deciding (not “affirming”) that if Iran were to produce high-enriched uranium, separate plutonium, or notify its withdrawal from the NPT before the IAEA is able to draw a broad conclusion of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, a number of well-defined additional sanctions would automatically be applicable and implemented. Similar measures would be adopted if Iran were found, after the grace period, to be proceeding with nuclear weaponization activities or to divert nuclear material.

...the Islamic Republic of Iran 1.) would have a nuclear energy program under IAEA safeguards including the Additional Protocol,
2.) would retain some nuclear assets which support a cliff-edge nuclear weapons capability,
3.) would be enriching uranium,
4.) would not be subject to international sanctions, and
5.) would benefit from an imprimatur from the IAEA (“broader conclusion”) following from implementation of the AP, expressing the IAEA’s confidence that Iran’s nuclear activities are exclusively dedicated to peaceful use.

Step 1: Iran would limit its uranium enrichment program to Natanz only. No new centrifuges would be added or new-generation centrifuges fabricated. In return, P5+1 would suspend part of the international sanctions stipulated in the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929.

Step 2: Iran would allow IAEA surveillance of centrifuges and implement an additional arrangement with the IAEA for enhanced design inspection of nuclear-related facilities (apparently less than an Additional Protocol - Cheryl), while uranium enrichment would be limited to 5 percent or lower. The P5+1 would begin gradually lifting the unilateral sanctions by the United States and key European nations.

Step 3: Iran would implement an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The P5+1 would suspend all U.N. Security Council sanctions.

Step 4: Iran would suspend all uranium enrichment and related activities for three months, while P5+1 would complete lifting all sanctions and remove the Iranian nuclear dispute from the IAEA Board of Governors agenda. The P5+1 would also start to implement ''incentives on cooperation in different fields.''

The door to rapprochement is closing. To keep it from slamming shut, the United States should declare, without condition, that it does not seek regime change in Tehran. Beyond that, the recognition of several principles is essential to bettering U.S.-Iranian relations after more than 30 bad years. For starters, both governments should practice patience and try to show mutual goodwill.

For one, both the United States and Iran are eager to understand the other's end game. Together, the two countries should draft a "grand agenda," which would include nuclear and all other bilateral, international, and regional issues to be discussed; outline what the ultimate goal will be; and describe what each side can gain by achieving it.

The United States and Iran should also work together on establishing security and stability in Afghanistan and preventing the Taliban's full return to power; securing and stabilizing Iraq; creating a Persian Gulf body to ensure regional stability; cooperating during accidents and emergencies at sea, ensuring freedom of navigation, and fighting piracy; encouraging development in Central Asia and the Caucasus; establishing a joint working group for combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism; and eliminating weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking in the Middle East. Finally, the two countries could do much good by strengthening the ties between their people through tourism, promoting academic and cultural exchanges, and facilitating visas.

A key first step for Iran: Allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency full access to its nuclear facilities, something they were denied on a recent trip. A key first step for the United States: Find a way to send a clear message to the supreme leader that we are serious about a deal.

Specifically, the West should recognize the legitimate right of Iran to produce nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment; remove sanctions; and normalize Iran’s nuclear file at the UN Security Council and the IAEA. To meet the P5+1 conditions, Iran should accept the maximum level of transparency by implementing the IAEA’s Subsidiary Arrangement Code 3.1 and the non-proliferation treaty’s Additional Protocol, which broadly enable intrusive monitoring and inspections of nuclear facilities.

To eliminate Western concerns about a possible nuclear weapons breakout using low-enriched uranium, any deal should place a limit on Iran’s enrichment activities to less than 5 percent. Low-enriched uranium covers enrichment by as much as 20 percent, a level that is more conducive for further enrichment to weapons grade. A deal should also cap the amount of low- enriched uranium hexafluoride that Iran can stockpile; limit its enrichment sites during a period of confidence building; establish an international consortium on enrichment in Iran; and commit not to reprocess low-enriched uranium during the confidence-building period.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s offer to stop 20 percent enrichment in exchange for a P5+1 commitment to provide fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor -- a proposal he made in comments to reporters last September after a speech to the UN General Assembly -- and Russia’s “Step-by-Step Plan” represent the most conducive path to reaching such a deal. The Russian plan includes full supervision by the IAEA; implementation of the non-proliferation treaty’s Additional Protocol and Subsidiary Arrangement; readiness to stop production of low- enriched uranium and limiting enrichment to 5 percent; halting the production and installation of new centrifuges; limiting enrichment sites to one; addressing the IAEA’s “possible military dimension” concerns and other technical ambiguities; and temporary suspension of enrichment.

In return, Iran would expect the P5+1 to remove sanctions and normalize Iran’s nuclear file in the IAEA and Security Council. Iran has already welcomed both initiatives. The U.S. and Europeans have declined. Instead, they have chosen to try coercion. The result was evidenced in recent days, as Iranian officials announced the insertion of their first domestically produced 20 percent fuel rod, and an increase in the number of enrichment centrifuges to 9,000 from 6,000.

It seems reasonable to suppose that an Iranian attempt to acquire nuclear weapons capability would have at least three ends, in probable descending order of importance: To have the asymmetric means to counter overwhelming US conventional armed superiority in the Gulf; to achieve a greater degree of regional prestige and hegemony over the Gulf Arab nations; and to counter the Israeli nuclear threat. Thus, a new political arrangement in the region designed to achieve strategic balance without resort to nuclear weapons, and to win broad regional support would need to include a firm political governor on the unfettered employment of unilateral military means by the US; mutual assurances against internal interference and subversion designed to allay Arab fears of Persian dominance; and a comprehensive regional denuclearisation regime - which would perforce include Israel.

One European decision maker recently laid out the possible cycle of escalation and counter-escalation. Israel would mount a bombing raid on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The US would not condemn the raid, while Europeans would halfheartedly speak out against the attack. When Iran retaliated against Israel, the Europeans and Americans would come to Israel’s aid, with defensive measures: perhaps, initially, in the form of naval protection.

But it is also thought likely that Iranian retaliation would be aimed not just at Israel but also at western interests, and perhaps even at the Gulf states.

That would lead to a much wider conflict. US air power would be used to knock out Iranian retaliatory capacity. Any Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would be swiftly challenged by the US navy, with some token European support. While the Gulf states could never support an Israeli attack on Iran, they might get involved in this second round of military action — if Iran were foolish enough to attack them first. All the discussion is of the use of air and naval power. There is no appetite for sending ground troops.

...what would we do if Tehran announces that it is prepared to put an end to its nuclear plans and to open up its facilities for all to see, on condition that Israel signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and opens its facilities to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency?

If Iran were to forgo its nuclear program and all the Arab states were to follow suit, the international community would ask, rightfully, why does Israel need a bomb? Whom does it have to deter? Either no country can have weapons of mass destruction, or all of them can. Sooner or later, Israel will have to agree to regional demilitarization.

Iran and the P5+1 could agree on a face-saving solution under which Iran would adhere to all international nuclear conventions and treaties at the maximum level of transparency defined by the IAEA. Furthermore, Iran would be flexible on 20 percent enrichment, its stockpile of material enriched to that level, and every other confidence-building measure to assure the international community that the country would remain a non-nuclear-weapon state forever. This would ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activity. In response, the United States and the other members of the P5+1 would agree to recognize Iran’s legitimate right to enrichment under the NPT and gradually lift the sanctions. This framework can be realized in forthcoming talks through a step-by-step plan based on the NPT, mutual confidence building, and appropriate reciprocity as agreed in the Istanbul talks in April.

To satisfy the concerns of the West regarding Iran’s 20 percent stockpile, a mutually acceptable solution for the long term would entail “a zero stockpile.” Under this approach, a joint committee of the P5+1 and Iran would quantify the domestic needs of Iran for use of 20 percent enriched uranium, and any quantity beyond that amount would be sold in the international market or immediately converted back to an enrichment level of 3.5 percent. This would ensure that Iran does not possess excess 20 percent enriched uranium forever, satisfying the international concerns that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. It would be a face-saving solution for all parties as it would recognize Iran’s right to enrichment and would help to negate concerns that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons.

Diplomacy with Iran should be seen as a process, with benchmarks and objectives, like any other high-stakes negotiation. These benchmarks would include a compromise on Iran’s right to enrichment; agreement on the latest fuel-swap proposal; a strategic pause in both Iranian enrichment and further sanctions; Iran’s involvement in regional security dialogue, including on Syria; and sanctions relief as a clear outcome for Iranian cooperation.

Iran’s right to enrich uranium should not be a deal breaker for the nuclear negotiations. It has been blown out of proportion by both sides. The P5+1 should acknowledge Iran’s right to enrichment in the context of its right to peaceful nuclear energy as a signatory to the NPT Non-prolifearation Treaty) and also recognise Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa against the development or use of nuclear weapons as a positive statement of policy. A compromise on enrichment should be conditioned by Iran’s acceptance of the Baghdad proposal as the first confidence-building benchmark for negotiations.